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Abstract
This study examines the optimal tax structure in an endogenous fertility model with
non-cooperative couples. In the model, both the quality and number of children are sub-
optimal because of the non-cooperative behavior of couples. Moreover, we consider the
external effects of children on society and center-based childcare services. In such a uni-
fied model, we characterize the formulae for optimal income tax rates, child tax/subsidy
rates, and tax/subsidy rates on center-based childcare services. We find that income
taxation, but not a child subsidy, corrects the suboptimal low fertility rate caused by
the non-cooperative behavior of couples. To alleviate the deadweight loss from income
taxation, a child tax is useful. The child tax (subsidy) becomes optimal if the required
tax revenue is sufficiently large (small) or if the external effects are sufficiently small
(large). The subsidy for external childcare services corrects the external effects of chil-
dren, not the non-cooperative behavior. These results are reinforced by the numerical
analysis.
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1 Introduction
Most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries face a
striking decrease in fertility rates: on average, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) has been below
replacement levels for about three decades, as shown in Figure 1.1 Since this demographic
trend may have a substantial adverse impact on economic growth, OECD governments
have designed a variety of pro-natalist policies to affect the willingness of families to raise
children, such as a direct child subsidy, a subsidy for center-based childcare services, income
tax deduction, a childbearing leave program, and enhancement of childcare facilities (e.g.,





























































































Figure 1: The OECD’s average total fertility rate over 1970-2017
If the demographic change stems from the sub-optimality of the family’s fertility choice,
it is crucial to clarify the mechanism of inefficient fertility choices and to implement effective
family policies. This study sheds light on two driving forces behind downward pressure on
fertility choice within a household: the external effects of children on society; and couples’
non-cooperative behavior for the provision of childcare. This study shows which family
policies are best for improving the fertility decisions that yield downward pressure on the
fertility rate.
1The TFR is the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her
childbearing years and give birth to children according to current age-specific fertility rates. Data on the
TFR used in Figure 1 are from OECD Data (https://data.oecd.org/pop/fertility-rates.htm).
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The externality of children on society has been treated as a major driving force behind
inefficiently low fertility in the modern economy. The previous literature has mainly con-
sidered the external effect of children to be a positive fiscal externality generated under
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems (e.g., Cigno, 1992; Sinn, 2001).2 The literature
on this subject concludes that child subsides have substantial capacity to achieve first-best
investment in fertility. However, the TFR has remained below replacement level even when
childbearing has been highly subsidized (e.g., Germany). It seems that there is very little
effect of child subsidies correcting such a positive fiscal externality of children on fertility
choice, since the process of fertility reductions is unchanged over time, not reversed.
This study provides another reason for the sub-optimal number of children from the
viewpoint of non-cooperative household behavior by a couple. In an economy consisting of
a representative couple, we introduce the strategic interaction between a husband and wife
in providing childcare, which leads to underinvestment in childcare (and hence, a subopti-
mal low level of child quality).3 The strategic interaction across partners is supported by
recent econometric evidence by Del Boca and Flinn (2012), who show that one-fourth of cou-
ples under-provide household public goods because of non-cooperative behavior. Regarding
childcare decisions, the literature has long recognized a couple’s inability to reach legally
enforceable agreements about their investments in children because of non-observability by
third parties (Rasul, 2008),4 and that their provision of childcare is not always observable
due to the lack of effective monitoring between partners (Pailhé and Solaz, 2008). Thus, the
commitment of the previously determined time investment in childcare is not credible.5 Al-
lowing for this fact, the present study theoretically considers that households do not commit
to their decisions regarding the time supplied for childcare and non-cooperatively determine
the time.6 In our model, the time invested by parents does not mean the time that parents
merely spend with their children but rather represents the time devoted to improving the
quality of, for example, their children’s non-cognitive and cognitive skills. In other words,
childcare time includes the aspect of educational investment in children (Del Boca et al.,
2014).7 Since the quality of children is generally private provision of a household public
2Cigno (1992) states that one motive for having children is to secure the risk of old-age consumption.
Since PAYG pension systems secure the risk of old-age consumption, public insurance induces people to have
fewer children, and thus, fertility rates fall. Sinn (2001) estimates that an additional child in Germany brings
a net benefit to the pension system of about 90,000 euros.
3Following previous literature as in de la Croix and Doepke (2003) and Gobbi (2018), we consider the
quality of children as a household public good.
4Rasul (2008) empirically proves that spouses cannot commit to household chores.
5Akerlof (1991) argues that a major function of management is to monitor accomplishment so as to
prevent procrastination in both project initiation and project termination.
6Browning et al. (2014) state that the behavior of spouses must be observable for each other to achieve
a Pareto-efficient allocation.
7Del Boca et al. (2014) indicate that the time inputs of not only mothers but also fathers are extremely
important in the cognitive development process, particularly for young children.
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good, the free-rider problem arises in our model.
Another feature of this study is that it separates the quality per child and the number
of children. Our model allows couples to collectively decide the number of children at the
stage prior to non-cooperative determination of time inputs supplied by each spouse.8 Under
this setting, we find that non-cooperative behavior for the provision of childcare leads to
an inefficient level of fertility deviating from the Pareto-efficient level, even though fertility
choice is made collectively. This is consistent with Doepke and Kindermann (2019), who
empirically conclude that non-cooperation of a couple due to lack of commitment leads to a
low fertility rate. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to theoretically derive
the result that the non-cooperative behavior of spouses leads to inefficiently low fertility.
Based on our finding, we propose a novel channel through which the government can enhance
low fertility rates by employing an appropriate choice of family policies. In addition, we
allow the quality per child as well as the number of children to have external effects on
society. Heckman (2006) and Heckman and Masterov (2007) empirically demonstrate that
the increase in quality of children improves the health conditions in local area, promotes
social skills, and reduces the crime rate and high school dropout rates, which implies that
the quality of children has external effects on society.
In addition, we introduce external childcare services offered by centers, which can be
substituted for childcare time of the spouses. Examples of such services are external early
childhood education facilities, preschools, and cram schools. In this extensive model, we
compare the effectiveness of the subsidy for center-based childcare services to that of the
direct child subsidy.
To clarify how the government should design tax structure to correct the sub-optimally
low fertility level, we allow the government to employ a commodity tax, income taxes, a
(direct) child tax/subsidy (tax/subsidy on/for a child), and a tax/subsidy on/for center-
based childcare services. We note that many countries face the problem of how to secure tax
revenue because of cumulative budget deficits and increasing social security expenditure. In
addition, a revenue source of subsidies for childcare should be allowed with the exception
of a lump-sum tax in the real-world tax system. Therefore, this study adopts the revenue-
constrained optimal tax framework, which originated with Ramsey (1927) and was extended
by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a, b) and Mirrlees (1971). This study allows policymakers to
employ differential income tax rates on the husband and wife, that is, so-called gender-based
income taxation.9 We also analyze the case of a common income tax rate on the husband
8The justification of our setting is that, even though fertility and time devoted to childcare are collectively
determined simultaneously, it is possible to change time devoted to childcare from what is planned today,
which means that a lack of commitment occurs (Rasul, 2008). In addition, there is no way of monitoring
a certain amount of childcare duties provided by the other partner (Pailhé and Solaz, 2008). Therefore, we
assume such a setting.
9We provide some citations of previous studies examining gender-based income taxation in the last para-
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and wife.
We demonstrate that, as the results of the comparative statics of a couple’s behavior
due to changes in taxes, the increase in the labor income tax enhances fertility. This
theoretical result is consistent with the empirical result by Baughman and Dickert-Conlin
(2009), showing that reduction of income taxes decreases the fertility rate. Under our
optimal tax framework, the income taxes, but not the child tax/subsidy, improve the low
fertility caused by spouses’ non-cooperative behavior. In other words, the income taxes have
a double dividend in that they increase tax revenue and correct the low fertility caused by
non-cooperative behavior. The child tax/subsidy acts as a device to mitigate the income tax-
induced deadweight loss, to cover the exogenous revenue requirement taking account of own
price-induced deadweight loss, and to correct the external effects of children on society. In
particular, under the availability of lump-sum taxes and no externality of children on society,
the optimal intervention for children is to impose a tax, which can alleviate the distortion on
labor supply from income taxation for correcting the non-cooperative behavior. However,
if the external effect of children on society is sufficiently large, the optimal intervention for
children is to provide a subsidy. These results hold regardless of whether the spouse uses
center-based childcare services. As other important results, the subsidy for center-based
childcare services becomes optimal as long as there is an externality of children on society
and the difference of bargaining power of spouses is not so large. The role of the subsidy
for the services is to correct the externality of children on society, but not to improve the
low fertility associated with non-cooperative behavior.
This study also employs numerical analysis to investigate the effects of changes in several
parameters on optimal tax rates. The theoretical results and interpretation are confirmed
by numerical simulations. As a major concern, we investigate the ranking of the direct
child subsidy and the subsidy for center-based childcare services. The result shows that
the subsidy for center-based childcare services is more likely to be higher than the direct
child subsidy as the required tax revenue becomes larger. The intuition behind this result
is provided by the theory. We also numerically confirm that the introduction of a childcare
facility always improves welfare, increases the number of children, and raises the quality per
child under the optimal tax framework. In addition, we examine how the difference in wage
rate, the variation in childcare productivity, and the difference in bargaining power between
spouses affect income tax rates on the husband and wife; this corresponds to the analysis
of gender-based taxation.
Based on our theoretical and numerical results, we suggest the following policy impli-
cations for family policies to improve the sub-optimally low fertility rate under a revenue
constraint. First, if the low fertility rate in most OECD countries critically arises from the
graph of Section 2.
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non-cooperative behavior of households, we recommend a downward shift of the direct child
subsidy as a policy reform, which may lead to a direct child tax. This is a novel conclusion in
our model that contrasts with findings from the previous literature emphasizing that Pigou-
vian corrective child subsidies are desirable. We show that income taxation is effective for
improving fertility rate rather than the direct child subsidy. This result is supported by some
empirical evidence, as shown in Jones and Tertilt (2008) and Jones et al. (2010).10 Second,
the child subsidy is generally not a useful device for alleviating non-cooperative behavior; it
is required if the externality of children on society is sufficiently large. When policymakers
aim to improve the TFR by correcting the externality arising from inefficient intra-household
behavior, it should employ a combination of income taxation and a child tax. Third, the in-
troduction of a childcare facility enhances the fertility rate and welfare. Our theoretical and
numerical results imply that the top priority of family policies for improving low fertility is
to ensure that childcare facilities are fully utilized. After improving and enhancing childcare
facilities, the government should discuss the design of a child tax/subsidy. This is because,
as shown by our numerical results, a child tax/subsidy implemented prior to expanding
childcare facilities worsens welfare and fertility rates. In 2009, the direct child subsidy was a
noticeable policy in Hatoyama administration in Japan. Commenting on this policy, Ángel
Gurria, secretary-general of the OECD, recommended that it was more important for Japan
to enhance childcare facilities than to provide a direct child subsidy. In addition, the fertility
rate has improved in countries that provide more public childcare, such as France, Belgium,
and Norway, while the fertility rate is still at low levels in countries with high subsidies
for childbearing, such as Germany (Doepke and Kindermann, 2019). Our findings support
the OECD’s policy recommendation and the policies implemented by France, Belgium, and
Norway. Fourth, under a high (low) revenue requirement, it is desirable that the subsidy
rate for center-based childcare services is higher (lower) than the direct child subsidy rate,
even if the direct child subsidy is optimal. Such policies may pertain to the optimal design of
a tax/subsidy system in developed countries (developing countries) where a relatively large
(small) amount of tax revenue is needed. Based on the third and fourth policy implications,
developed (developing) countries should expand childcare facilities and then implement the
subsidy for center-based childcare services (the direct child subsidy), rather than the direct
child subsidy (the subsidy for center-based child care services).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the
related literature. Section 3 describes our model and Section 4 provides solutions of our
model. The optimal taxation is analyzed in Section 5 and a childcare facility is introduced
as an extension to the model in Section 6. Numerical analysis is undertaken in Section 7.
Section 8 concludes.
10Jones and Tertilt (2008) and Jones et al. (2010) empirically show that fertility is negatively related to
the wage rate in most countries at most times.
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2 Related Literature
This study constructs a model with non-cooperative couples who under-invest in the quality
of children and examines the optimal structure that plays a corrective role as an efficiency-
enhancing device under a revenue constraint. In this respect, our study is mainly related
to four strands of research. First, various previous works have investigated the structure of
the household’s decision-making. In the traditional framework, households are considered
as a single decision-making agent, known as the “unitary” approach initiated by Samuel-
son (1956) and Becker (1974). Owing to a lack of empirical support for the unitary model
of households, Apps and Rees (1988) and Chiappori (1988, 1992) propose a “collective”
approach, allowing for bargaining power between spouses and assuming that households
achieve a Pareto-efficient allocation.11 A common assumption of the unitary and collec-
tive approach is that intra-household behavior is efficient. However, recent literature has
increasingly employed the non-cooperative model in which the allocation is not fully ef-
ficient (Konrad and Lommerud, 1995; Cigno, 2012; Gobbi, 2018).12 The non-cooperative
model is supported by empirical evidence. For example, Del Boca and Flinn (2012) estimate
household time allocation between labor market work and production of a public good, and
find that about one-fourth of households act non-cooperatively. Our analysis builds on the
literature on the non-cooperative model of households.
The second relevant strand of literature concerns the design of optimal taxation for
households consisting of two or more agents.13 In particular, using the self-selection ap-
proach (Stiglitz, 1982), Balestrino et al. (2002) develop a two-type model with non-linear
labor income taxation, non-linear child taxes/subsidies, and linear commodity taxation,
when households differ in ability in the labor market and ability in household production.
Like our model, these models consider that both fertility and child quality are endogenously
determined.14 In their model, the government’s intervention is justified by not only equity
considerations (redistribution from rich to poor) but also allocative efficiency considerations
(specialization according to comparative advantage). The justification for the government’s
intervenstion stems from differences in the two kinds of abilities between households. The
11The unitary model ensures an income-pooling result, in which a change in the source of household income
does not affect demand if total income is constant. For example, this is empirically rejected by Browning
and Chiappori (1998).
12Non-cooperative family decision-making has been adopted in the theoretical, empirical, and experimental
literature. In particular, as with our model, Konrad and Lommerud (1995), Cigno (2012), and Gobbi (2018)
use a non-cooperative model for childcare decisions. See other related literature of the non-cooperative
model, for example, Lundberg and Pollak (1993), Anderberg (2007), Lechene and Preston (2011), Cochard
et al. (2016), Doepke and Tertilt (2019), and Heath and Tan (2020).
13There is a growing body of literature analyzing the optimal family taxation scheme; see, for example,
Cremer et al. (2003, 2011b, 2016, 2020), Schroyen (2003), Brett (2007), Kleven and Kreiner (2007), Kleven
et al. (2009), Meier and Wrede (2013), Frankel (2014), and Apps and Rees (2018).
14There are other related works exploring the optimal system of policy instruments under endogenous
fertility and child quality (e.g., Cigno, 2001; Cigno and Pettini, 2002).
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model of Balestrino et al. (2002) falls within the “unitary” approach that supports Pareto
efficiency. Thus, the fertility rate is initially efficient in their model. By contrast, we consider
another justification for the government’s intervention, which is to correct the externality
arising from non-cooperative household behavior. Moreover, using the Ramsey tax frame-
work, our study analyzes optimal tax policies for improving the sub-optimally low fertility
induced by non-cooperative couples. In a recent contribution, Meier and Rainer (2015)
study gender-based income taxation in the model with a non-cooperatively provided house-
hold public good, which leads to under-provision of the public good, and find that marginal
income tax rates should be differentiated by gender based on both the Pigou and the Ramsey
considerations. In the model, the production of household public goods is under-provided
due to non-cooperative behavior. Even though their setting is similar to ours, our study
differs in three ways from their framework. First, we separate the household public good
into two factors: quality per child and number of children. Second, our model allows the
government to employ a child tax/subsidy as a direct intervention on a public good. Third,
we introduce center-based childcare services, which can be substituted for childcare time of
the spouses.
The third strand of literature discusses the driving force behind the low fertility rate in
an economy and then establishes Pareto-improving family policies that correct the ineffi-
ciency. One major explanation for the decrease in the number of children is that children
involve a positive fiscal externality when the government redistributes from the young to
the old (e.g., PAYG transfers). As argued in Cigno (1992), the PAYG transfers lead to a
sub-optimal number of children, since children, who parents consider as assets, are no longer
needed to secure consumption in retirement. Groezen et al. (2003) analyze the role of a child
allowance scheme when fertility is socially inefficient owing to the PAYG transfers.15 They
show that the child allowance system ensures the first-best outcome under lump-sum trans-
fers. Compared to these studies, the present study proposes a theoretical framework that
describes inefficiently low fertility due to limited commitment leading to non-cooperative
behavior by a couple in addition to the external effect of children on society, and then
provides the optimal structure of family policy measures.
The fourth strand of literature is gender-based taxation, which allows tax rates to differ
between the husband and wife. Rosen (1977) is the first to argue the efficiency gains from
employing differential taxation based on gender, while Akerlof (1978) shows that the use of
categorical information, such as age, gender, and disability status, which is called “tagging,”
is welfare improving from the viewpoint of utilitarianism.16 Therefore, if the government
15Cigno et al. (2003), Fenge and Meier (2005), and Cremer et al. (2008, 2011a) are among the related
literature on family policy in the presence of fiscal externalities.
16It is well known that tagging violates the principle of horizontal equity and therefore, is limited in
practice.
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reflects observable characteristics in the tax system, it can reinforce the redistributive tax
system. A number of studies explore the gender-based taxation system, see, for example,
Boskin and Shesinski (1983), Piggott and Whalley (1996), Apps and Rees (1999a, b, 2011),
Cremer et al. (2010), Alesina et al. (2011), Bastani (2013), Meier and Rainer (2015), and
Komura et al. (2019).
3 Model
A household consists of a wife (m), husband (f), and children. The wife and husband
collectively decide how many children to have, while each spouse non-cooperatively decides
his/her two kinds of private consumption, labor supply in the external market, and time
spent on childcare activities. The parental time investment in childcare enhances the quality
of children, such as their non-cognitive and cognitive skills. Children positively affect the
utility of both spouses as a household public good, which may give rise to a free-rider problem
between the spouses in the process of enhancing the quality of children. Furthermore, we
allow children to positively affect society as externalities.
The government corrects the free-rider problem and the externalities on society, while
facing a revenue constraint. The government imposes taxes on income for each spouse and
implements a tax/subsidy on/for a child. Here, a tax/subsidy on/for a child is called a
(direct) child tax/subsidy, where the recipients of the tax burden/subsidy proportionally
increase with the number of children. This study considers the case in which the income
tax rates on husband and wife are allowed to differ: so-called “gender-based taxation.”17
We consider the following sequential decisions of the government, the couple, and each
spouse. First, the government determines the tax rates to collect a given level of tax revenue
and to correct the sub-optimally low fertility level. Second, the wife and husband collectively
decide on the number of children. Third, each spouse non-cooperatively decides his/her two
kinds of private consumption: labor supply in the external market, and time spent on
childcare.
3.1 Third Stage: Each Spouse
Each spouse non-cooperatively decides the working time in outside labor market li, the time
spent by each spouse on childcare activities hi, and private consumption of the numeraire
zi and other commodity yi. We suppose that children provide direct utility benefits, that
17Gender-based taxation is equivalent to the combination of a common tax rate on both genders and a
tax rate deduction on women. Only women bear burdens over the fertility period, such as the time devoted
to pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation. It is plausible that a subsidy or tax deduction in allowance would
be provided for these burdens.
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is, children are a consumption good. Spouse i’s utility Ui is given by
Um = zm +
yφm
φ












where φ(< 1) is the curvature of the utility of commodity y, ϕ(> 0) is that of the disutility
of total time use, N is the number of children, and Q is the quality per child. c(N) is a
cost that only wives bear, depending on the number of children. This cost includes that
arising from the biology of child rearing over the fertility period, such as the time devoted
to pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation (Rasul, 2008).18 The cost function is assumed to
satisfy c′ > 0 and c′′ > 0. NQ positively and equally affects the two spouses as a household
public good.19


























where si denotes the productively of spouse i for child quality and σ, which satisfies 0 <
σ < 1, is the curvature of the quality function.20 hi/N is the childcare time per child. As
an aspect of cost, hi includes not only the time used for domestic childcare, but also the
intensity and quality per unit of time. As an aspect of benefit, childcare time hi includes
not only the mere time spent raising a child, but also the time for improving Q, such as
the time spent reading books to children, the time spent on early childhood education at
home, and the cost of effort to discipline children. Childcare time hi can be divided into two
components: hi = h̃i + τN , where h̃i is the time spent enhancing the quality of children,
and τ is the (constant) minimal amount of time spent raising a child; hence, τN is the
total minimal amount of time spent bringing up children. If τ is exogenous, the theoretical
results obtained in this study are unaffected as long as the equilibrium is an interior solution
18Rasul (2008) also assumes that only a wife bears the cost function.
19Although sub-utility functions in our model are specified, the generalization of the sub-utility function,
such as
Um = zm + κm(ym) +ϖm(lm + hm) + ϵm(N,Q),
Uf = zf + κf (yf ) +ϖf (lf + hf ) + ϵf (N,Q)− c(N),
does not affect the optimal tax/subsidy expressions provided in Propositions 4–7, which are the main the-
oretical results in our study. This is because our optimal tax/subsidy rates are expressed in terms of price
elasticities.
20Meier and Rainer (2015) use a similar function for the household public good. However, in contrast to
their setting, we divide the number of children from the quality per child, and the number of children and
quality level are determined in the different stages.
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(h̃i > 0). Thus, our setting presented by (1) and (2) is not restrictive.
21
In our model, both spouses provide the childcare time. Indeed, Del Boca et al. (2014)
and Lundborg et al. (2014) empirically prove that the time invested by both a husband
and wife is important for human capital formation of children. In particular, Del Boca
et al. (2014) indicate that the time inputs of both parents are extremely important in the
cognitive development process, particularly for young children, and we assume that the time
fathers spend with children positively affects child quality. In addition, our quality function
(2) does not include some commodities as inputs. This assumption also follows Del Boca et
al. (2014), who empirically find that the effect of money on child outcomes is much more
limited than the effect of parental time with children.
The budget constraint of each spouse is
zi + (1 + ty)pyyi + γxipNx+ γNiκNN = (1− ti)wili, i = m, f, (3)
where ty is the commodity tax rate on yi, py is the price of yi, γxi is the share of spouse
i on the purchase of the fertility good, x is the amount of a fertility good that a couple
purchases, pN is the price of x, γNi is the share of spouse i in the child tax payment or
child subsidy receipt, κN is the child tax/subsidy, ti (for i = m, f) is the income tax rate
on the labor income of spouse i, and wi is the wage rate of spouse i. The before-tax prices
of the numeraire good are normalized by one without loss of generality. The shares of the
purchase of a fertility good and child tax payment (child subsidy receipt) are given for each
spouse at a certain level, satisfying γxm + γxf = 1 and γNm + γNf = 1.
The required amount of the fertility good is given by the following function:
x = υN, (4)
for a scalar υ. The cost includes food, clothing, medical expense, and overhead expenses
needed for compulsory education.22 The ratio of expenditure on nursery schools, tutors,
and cram education to the cost of bringing up a child seems to be very large, particularly
in developed countries. However, this expenditure is related to improving the quality per
child. The extensive case in which such expenditure affects the quality per child is dealt
with in Section 6. To make the analysis simpler but without loss of generality, we assume
that one unit of the fertility good is needed to bring up a child, that is, υ = 1, (Groezen et
al., 2003),23 and that the shares of the purchase of a fertility good and child tax payment
21Note that the first-order conditions of hi and N are identical to (12) and (26), respectively, as long as
interior solutions are ensured, that is, hi > τN .
22Compulsory education includes lunch fees, material fees, stationery fees, field trip fees, study tour fees,
and school excursion fees.
23This simple assumption is also adopted by Groezen et al. (2003).
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are equal, that is, γxi = γNi(≡ γi) for i = m, f .24
Under these assumptions, (3) can be rewritten as
zi + (1 + ty)pyyi + γi(1 + tN )pNN = (1− ti)wili, i = m, f, (5)
where tN (≡ κN/pN ) is the tax rate on the number of children in terms of the price of
the fertility good. Each spouse has a different budget constraint, which is based on the
non-cooperative couple model (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993; Konrad and Lommerud, 1995;
Anderberg, 2007; Lechene and Preston, 2011; Cigno, 2012; Meier and Rainer, 2015; Doepke
and Tertilt, 2019; Heath and Tan, 2020).25 Denoting γm as γ and hence, γf as 1 − γ and
making use of (2) and (5), (1) can be rewritten as




































Each spouse decides its own labor supply and time use for childcare, taking childcare time
of the partner and the number of children as given. Spouse i does not consider that his or
her own childcare time positively affects the partner’s utility. As for childcare, as shown
by Rasul (2008), partners do not commit to supplying a certain amount of childcare duties
(i.e., there is no clause in the marriage contract regarding how much time each parent
should spend with children). Moreover, actions are unobservable, and there is no way of
monitoring the time the other partner spends with the children (Pailhé and Solaz, 2008).
Hence, I resort to a Cournot–Nash non-cooperative game to model the third stage, which
leads to a sub-optimally low quality of children owing to the free-rider problem.26
24Even if these two assumptions υ = 1 and γxi = γNi are relaxed, our theoretical results are unaffected






γxipNvN . Defining t̃N ≡ γNiκN/γxipNv and p̃N ≡ γxipNv, the expression becomes(
1 + t̃N
)
p̃NN , which is the same form as the third term on the left-hand side in (5).
25Substantial evidence that each spouse has his or her own budget constraint has been documented by
Pahl (1983, 1995, 2008), Kenney (2006), and Lauer and Yodanis (2014).
26This assumption is supported by recent econometric evidence from Del Boca and Flinn (2012), showing
that one-fourth of couples under-provide household public goods because of non-cooperative behavior.
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3.2 Second Stage: Couple
In the second stage, the number of children N is collectively determined as a decision of the
couple. In this decision, the couple takes the income tax rates and the child tax/subsidy rate
as given. The couple’s utility function is a weighted average of the utility of the spouses:
U = ρUm + (1− ρ)Uf , (7)
where ρ is the bargaining power of the husband and satisfies 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. The value of the
bargaining power ρ is assumed constant in our model.27 If the couple considers the cost
c(N) as an important factor, ρ would be less than 0.5, which leads to low fertility.28 The
couple maximizes U , allowing for li and hi to be functions of N , which is formulated in the
third decision stage.29 This means that the decision about the number of children is made
prior to the non-cooperative decisions regarding li, hi, zi, and yi. Even though the number
of children and time devoted to childcare are collectively determined, it is possible to deviate
from what is planned today and to non-cooperatively determine the amount of childcare due
to a lack of commitment and effective monitoring, as explained above. Thus, we postulate
that couples collectively determine the number of children prior to time inputs made non-
cooperatively by both a husband and wife. In the setting, since the couple collectively decide
the number of children, the determination process of N is efficient. However, the number of
children is inefficiently under-provided, because the couple knows that the quality per child
Q is under-provided in the next stage. This is discussed in Subsection 4.3.
This setting is applicable to housing and healthcare. For example, a couple collectively
determines the area size, design, and floor plan of a house, and then, each spouse non-
cooperatively provides housing maintenance. As an alternative example, the couple collec-
tively decides their medical insurance, and then, each spouse non-cooperatively maintains
his/her own health.
The number of children N can be divided into two components, N = N + Ñ , where N
is the preliminarily determined number of children, which can be the number of children
desired by the spouse who wants the lower number of children,30 and Ñ is the endogenously
determined number. For example, N is the number of children that a couple determines or
promises before marriage and Ñ is the number after marriage. If each spouse intends to
27Komura et al. (2019) consider endogenous bargaining power depending on the relative income difference
between a husband and wife.
28As long as ρ = 0.5, even if the husband also bears this type of cost or even if the cost is shared by
the spouses, the theoretical results obtained in this study are unaffected, because the number of children is
collectively determined.
29Note that this optimization allows for the budget constraint of each spouse, because Ui (i = m, f) in (7)
corresponds to each spouse’s utility given by (6).
30Let N i (for i = m, f) to be the number of children that spouse i wants. N can be regarded as
min[Nm, Nf ].
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have at least one child before marriage, that is, N = 1, Ñ can be interpreted as subsequent
children determined by the spouses. Throughout this study, the change in N may be
interpreted as that in Ñ .
3.3 First Stage: Government
The government maximizes its social welfare under a revenue constraint by manipulating
income taxes and the child tax/subsidy. We suppose that the objective function of the
government is the utilitarian optimum with equal weights between the husband and wife,
while a possibly larger evaluation is given by the number of children multiplied by the
quality per child (Bastani et al., 2017).31 The government’s welfare function is given by
W = Um + Uf + µNQ, (8)
where µ(≥ 0) is the weight on the children multiplied by the quality per child.32 If µ > 0,
the government regards the children multiplied by the quality per child as more important
than the arguments other than NQ in the spouses’ utility. In this case, the country puts
weight on its own future in respect of economic growth, presence, tax revenue. In particular,
the promotion of human capital investment potentially increases the future tax base, which
leads to a reduction of tax burdens on future generations. This term can be also interpreted
as the externality of children on society, in the sense that a couple does not consider the
effects of their children on society. For example, the improvement of Q enhances the local
security level, promotes social skills, and reduces adverse health conditions as external
effects (Heckman, 2006; Heckman and Masterov, 2007). In addition, as the quality per
child improves, peer effects that children produce positive learning spillovers in school life
increase. As the external effects of N , children can learn sociality from the community of
children, and parents can also learn about childcare and receive information about education
and medical care from other couples with children. The increase in N generates synergy
effects if Q has peer effects. Moreover, under PAYG social security systems, the size of a
person’s pension benefits relies on the number of all households’ children, as considered in
many previous studies.
The revenue constraint of the government is
R = tmwmlm + tfwf lf + typy(ym + yf ) + tNpNN, (9)
31Bastani et al. (2017) also incorporate an additively separable term expressing such positive externalities
in the social welfare function, like our social welfare function.










in which the husband and wife are associated with the same weight, and ς adjusts the difference between





W̃ = Um + Uf + ψNQ, where
ψ ≡ 2(1− ς)/ς, which is the same formula as (8).
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where R is the required tax revenue and its level is assumed to be constant. The government
maximizes (8) with respect to tm, tf , ty, and tN , subject to (9).
33 To make the analysis
meaningful, throughout this study, we assume that the required tax revenue exceeds the
revenue collected from the externality-correcting tax systems.
4 Solutions of the Model
4.1 Spouse
In this section, we analyze the solutions of utility maximization of each spouse and the
properties of the labor supply function and the childcare function. From (6), we obtain the













= − (li + hi)ϕ +N1−σsσi hσ−1i , i = m, f. (12)
Defining the after-tax wage rate as ωi(≡ (1− ti)wi), (10), (11), and (12) immediately yield
yi(ty) = [(1 + ty) py]
1
φ−1 , i = m, f, (13)






i N, i = m, f, (14)









i N, i = m, f, (15)
hi(ti, N ;wi, si) + li(ti, N ;wi, si) = ω
1
ϕ
i , i = m, f. (16)
The aggregate time for the external labor market and domestic childcare, given by (16),
depends only on the after-tax wage rate ωi and the parameter of the sub-utility function
ϕ, because of a quasi-linear utility functional form. From (14) and (15), the time spent on
domestic childcare and the external labor market is affected by the productivity of household
33We implicitly assume that the government uses its tax revenue to purchase a public good g, satisfying
g = R, and provides it to consumers. In addition, we assume that the public good is additively separable in
each spouse’s utility; that is, Ui + g. Then, the precise expressions for the couple’s utility function and the
government’s objective function are U+g andW+2g, respectively. From these functional forms and constant
g, owing to the fixed revenue requirement, we find that the optimal conditions presented hereafter are not
affected by g. Therefore, our results remain valid even if the constant public good is explicitly introduced to
the utility functions. Furthermore, if there are many identical couples in this economy, the amount of the
public good G = Kg = KR, where K is the number of couples and R can be interpreted as the tax revenue
collected from couples. Even in this case, our results remain valid, because G is additively separable in each
spouse’s utility function and G is constant.
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production si, the number of children N , as well as the after-tax wage rate ωi, because the
per-child quality depends on hi, si, and N (Equation (2)). From (13), the commodity yi
depends only on the tax-inclusive price and the parameter of the sub-utility function φ.















































































i N > 0, i = m, f. (20)
(17) and (18) show that time spent on childcare increases and time spent on the external
labor market decreases with the number of children N and with the productivity of childcare
si. These results are very intuitive. The increase in N obviously requires more time to be
spent on childcare. The increase in the productivity of childcare si enhances the marginal
utility of hi through the change in Q and hence, the time spent on childcare increases with
si. The amount of the increase in hi is the same as that of the decrease in li, because N
and si do not affect aggregate time hi + li, that is, hiN + liN = 0 and hisi + lisi = 0, as
shown by (17) and (18). This is confirmed by (16). ωi also gives the opposite effects on
li and hi: time spent on childcare decreases and that spent on the external labor market
increases, while time spent on the external labor market increases with the after-tax wage
ωi. However, the amount of the increase in li exceeds that of the decrease in hi. From (19)
and (20), we have






i > 0, i = m, f, (21)
which shows that the income taxation yields the price-distortions.
The comparison of time allocation between the wife and husband is also obtained from
(17)–(20). The results are summarized as the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that ωi ≥ ωj and si ≤ sj with at least one strict inequality. Then,
(i) li > lj , (ii) hi < hj, (iii) hiN < hjN , and (iv) −liN < −ljN .
Proposition 1(i) is obtained from (18) and (20), and (ii) from (18) and (19). We also
confirm these results from (14) and (15). Proposition 1(i) and (ii) show that the time al-
location of the couple is similar to Ricardo’s comparative advantage in international trade
theory. Proposition 1(iii) and (iv) are obtained from (17). They imply that the effects of
abilities wi and si on time allocation increase with a larger number of children. In other
16
words, the existence of children strengthens the movement toward a complete division of
labor between the external labor market and domestic childcare if there are gender differ-
ences in productivity, wi and si. In our model, a corner solution in which N = 0 is possible:
however, to obtain fruitful suggestions, we assume that N > 0 under the optimal taxation.
Our numerical examples, provided in Section 7, ensure that N > 0.
Finally, we show that the income taxation yields the price-distortions on time allocation
between hi and li. By noting that liti = −wiliωi and hiti = −wihiωi for i = m, f , (19), (20),







































i N > 0, i = m, f, (23)






i < 0, i = m, f. (24)
The income taxes can change the time allocation between the external labor market and do-
mestic childcare: the labor supply of spouse i decreases, and his/her childcare time increases
with the income tax rate on spouse i. Thus, income taxes can play the role of correcting the
non-cooperative behavior of spouses. In other words, the optimal income taxation involves
the Pigouvian tax consideration. However, since the income tax reduces the total amount
of time spent on the labor market and domestic childcare, as shown by (24), it inevitably
yields the price-distortions.
4.2 Couple
In this subsection, we consider the couple’s decision on the number of children. Allowing for
(13)–(15), the couple maximizes (7) with respect to N ; this is the collective optimization
17
problem of the couple. (7) is represented by
U = ρ
[



















































(1− tf )wfhfN (tf ).
(See Appendix A). This implies that
N = N(tN , tm, tf ). (27)
Although the number of children is collectively determined, it downwardly deviates from an
efficient level. This is specifically discussed in Subsection 4.3. In this subsection, we provide
an intuition for this result. From (2), we observe thatNQ = (N1−σ/σ) [(smhm)
σ + (sfhf )
σ] ,
which shows that the smaller hi leads to the lower marginal utility of N . Because the spouses
non-cooperatively take care of their children in the third stage, the amount of hi is under-
provided. Thus, the number of the children is also under-provided.
Totally differentiating (26) with respect to N, tm, tf , and tN and making use of (17)


















































= − [(1− ρ)(1− γ) + ργ] pN
(1− ρ)c′′
< 0. (30)
From (28)–(30), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. (i) Nti > 0 for i = m, f, and NtN < 0. (ii) Suppose that ρ = 0.5. Then, if
wm ⋛ wf and sm = sf , Ntm ⋚ Ntf , and if wm = wf and sm ⋚ sf , Ntm ⋚ Ntf . (iii) Suppose
that wm = wf and sm = sf . Then, if ρ ⋛ 0.5, Ntm ⋚ Ntf .
Proposition 2(i) shows that the number of children increases with the income tax rates.
As mentioned above, children are under-provided because both spouses are aware of non-
cooperative behavior for childcare in the next stage. Since time spent on childcare increases
with the income tax, which is shown by (23), the quality per child is improved with the
income tax rates and then the number of children is also increased. This result has a very
interesting policy implication. The income taxation both raises tax revenue and improves
low fertility. There is overwhelming empirical evidence that fertility is negatively related to
the wage rate in most countries at most times (Jones and Tertilt, 2008; Jones et al., 2010),
which supports our theoretical results. Although income effects due to income reduction
have negative effects on the fertility rate, the decrease in after-tax wage lowers the oppor-
tunity cost of having children. As a result, the former effect is not actually so large and
hence, the increase in income tax can raise the fertility rate.
As discussed in the last part of Subsection 3.2, if N = 1, the change in N can be
interpreted as the change in subsequent children after the first child. Baughman and Dickert-
Conlin (2009) empirically show that the income tax deduction decreases the number of
subsequent children after the first child, which supports the first result in Proposition 2(i).
The second result in Proposition 2(i) shows that the direct child subsidy unambiguously
raises the fertility rate. The intuition of this result is straightforward. Proposition 2(i)
shows that both the high-income tax rate and low child tax (or child subsidy) rate increases
the number of children. Here, an important question arises: which of these two instruments
plays the role of correcting low fertility caused by non-cooperative behavior in a revenue-
constrained optimal tax framework? This is examined in Section 5.
From Proposition 2(ii), we observe that the income tax imposed on the spouse with the
lower productivity in the external labor market, or with the higher productivity of childcare,
yields a higher birthrate-improvement effect. This is because, as shown by Proposition 1(iii),
the income tax imposed on such a spouse yields larger marginal effects on childcare time.
Proposition 2(iii) shows that an increase in the income tax rate on a spouse with lower
bargaining power induces a couple to have more children. In other words, although income
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taxes improve the number of children, the effect of income taxes on a spouse with higher
bargaining power is limited. Without loss of generality, we consider a case in which the
bargaining power of the husband is larger (i.e., ρ > 0.5). Notice that the increase in tm
directly decreases the disposable income of the husband, although the increase in tf does
not directly affect the disposable income. Given this fact and lmN < 0, the husband desires
fewer children to mitigate the reduction of his private consumption when tm increases than
when tf increases. Thus, since the couple’s decision about N regards the husband’s utility
as being more important, the increase in N is more mitigated when tm increases than when
tf increases.
Before analyzing the government’s optimization, we provide the functions of li and hi,
which allows for (14), (15), and (27) as
li(ti, N(tN , tm, tf )), hi(ti, N(tN , tm, tf )), i = m, f. (31)
These functions involve information about the decision in the second and third stages.
Allowing for (31), the government maximizes social welfare subject to the tax revenue
constraint.
4.3 First-best Allocation of Time and Number of Children
The objective of this subsection is to justify the government’s intervention for correcting the
inefficiently low fertility due to non-cooperative behavior by a couple. Thus, we compare two
allocations without the government’s intervention: the first-best Pareto-efficient allocation
and a household allocation in our non-cooperative decision-making model. If the number
of children under the non-cooperative setting deviates from the (first-best) socially efficient
level, then efficiency-enhancing policy intervention is desirable. First, we derive the first-
best Pareto efficient allocation without the government’s intervention, which corresponds
to a maximization problem of one partner’s utility subject to a given level of the other and
the resource constraint. The Lagrangian is expressed by
max
zm, zf , ym, yf , lm,
lf , hm, hf , N
L = zm +
yφm
φ



































+ ζ (wmlm + wf lf − zm − zf − py(ym + yf )− pNN) ,
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− ιc′(N)− ζpN . (41)
Before comparing the number of children between the two cases, to avoid confusion, we
denote the number of children under the Pareto-efficient allocation by NPE and that under
the non-cooperative case by NNC .36 Using (33)–(40), (41) can be rewritten as


























(see Appendix B). (42) determines NPE . We next derive the condition that determines the
number of children under the non-cooperative case. Given ti = 0 for i = m, f and tN = 0,
substituting (17) for hiN in (26) yields


























which determines NNC .
To clarify the effect of non-cooperative household behavior on the number of children,
35Note that Q is replaced by the right-hand side in (2).
36Note that NNC is the number of children when there are no taxes and subsidies.
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we consider ρ = 0.5, that is, we eliminate the difference of bargaining power across spouses.
In this case, (43) can be rewritten as





































2(≡ π(σ)) > 0. We can prove that π(σ) > 0 for any 0 < σ < 1 (see
Appendix C). Therefore, NPE > NNC . This is summarized as the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under ρ = 0.5, if a couple non-cooperatively provides the time invested in
children, the number of children is under-provided, that is, NPE > NNC .
Although NPE is realized under a situation in which the time devoted to childcare
and the number of children are determined simultaneously, the sequential decision, that
the number of children is determined prior to consumption and time allocation, does not
result in under-investment in fertility. Indeed, the number of children, which is determined
prior to collective decisions concerning Q, is at the same level as that under the Pareto-
efficient allocation, that is, NPE = NC , where NC denotes the number of children under
the collective case in the sequential decision (see Appendix D). Thus, when ρ = 0.5 holds,
the low fertility stems from only the non-cooperative household behavior. Furthermore, this
argument holds even under the introduction of a childcare facility in Section 6.37 This implies
that, the time children spend in a childcare facility does not solve parental under-investment
in childcare owing to the non-cooperative household behavior, although it increases the
quality per child.
5 Optimal Taxation
In this section, we examine the optimal structure of the income taxes and the child tax/subsidy.
The income tax rates can be differentiated across genders, which is so-called “gender-based
taxation.” The gender-based taxation is a generalization of the linear income taxation on a
couple. The case with the common income tax rate on a couple, which is more restrictive
and realistic tax system, essentially yields the same results as the case with gender-based
taxation (see Appendix E). By allowing for (13), (27), and (31), the government’s welfare
37We provide an outline of the proof. First, we conclude that NPE > NNC holds even in the presence of
a childcare facility using π(σ) > 0 for any 0 < σ < 1, which is shown in Appendix C. Furthermore, using a
similar method in Appendix D, we show that NPE = NC holds even under a childcare facility.
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function and tax revenue constraint are represented by






(lm(tm, N(tN , tm, tf )) + hm(tm, N(tN , tm, tf )))
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ





(lf (tf , N(tN , tm, tf )) + hf (tf , N(tN , tm, tf )))
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
− c(N(tN , tm, tf ))− (1 + tN )pNN(tN , tm, tf )
− (1 + ty)py(ym(ty) + yf (ty)) + (2 + µ)(N(tN , tm, tf ))1−σ
·
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R = tmwmlm(tm, N(tN , tm, tf )) + tfwf lf (tf , N(tN , tm, tf )) (46)
+ typy (ym(ty) + yf (ty)) + tNpNN(tN , tm, tf ),
respectively. The government maximizes welfare (45) under the tax revenue constraint
(46) by manipulating ty, tm, tf , and tN . Let us define the Lagrange function as L and
the Lagrange multiplier on the revenue constraint as λ. Allowing for (17), the first-order















= −wmlm + (1− tm)wmlmtm + (1− tm)wmlmNNtm (48)
− (lm + hm)ϕ (lmtm + hmtm) + (1− tf )wf lfNNtm − c′Ntm

























= (1− tm)wmlmNNtf − wf lf + (1− tf )wf lftf + (1− tf )wf lfNNtf (49)




− c′Ntf − (1 + tN )pNNtf




























= (1− tm)wmlmNNtN + (1− tf )wf lfNNtN − c′NtN − pNN (50)




















− λ (tmwmlmNNtN + tfwf lfNNtN + pNN + tNpNNtN ) .
From these conditions, we first provide the optimal tax expressions and then discuss the
optimal tax structure.
















.38 This is a standard Ramsey tax expression, and
the optimal tax rate on commodity yi follows the well-known inverse elasticity rule. Let
us consider the case in which the lump-sum tax is available for the government; that is,
the government does not virtually face the revenue constraint. Let us denote the lump-sum
tax by tL. Since a couple consists of two spouses, 2tL is subtracted from the government’s
welfare and is added to the revenue constraint. Thus, the first-order condition with respect
to tL is that tL : 0 = −2 − 2λ, which leads to λ = −1 and hence, β(≡ (1 + λ)/λ) = 0.
Therefore, the optimal tax rate on commodity y is zero. This is a natural consequence of
the optimal tax theory under a revenue constraint. However, this consequence does not hold
for the optimal income taxes and the child tax/subsidy in our model, as shown below.
Using (11), (12), and (50), after some manipulation, (48) and (49) can be rewritten as
the following simple conditions (see Appendix F):
tm : 0 = −(1 + λ)wmlm − λtmwmlmtm (52)
+ (1 + µ)(1− tm)wmhmtm + (1 + λ)pNNN−1tN Ntm ,
38Note that y′i(≡ ∂yi/∂ty) = py(∂yi/∂(1 + ty)py). Thus, Ξ is the own price elasticity of commodity y.
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tf : 0 = −(1 + λ)wf lf − λtfwf lftf (53)
+ (1 + µ)(1− tf )wfhftf + (1 + λ)pNNN−1tN Ntf .
These conditions explain the effects of the income taxes clearly and intuitively. The first
two terms reflect the price-distortion effects on resource allocation between the working time
and the consumption of the numeraire. These terms are related to a standard Ramsey tax
implication. In our model, the income taxes also alter the time allocation from hence he
external labor market to childcare time. This effect is described by the third term, which
involves the corrective taxes for non-cooperative behavior, taking account of the weight
µ on NQ. The fourth term reflects the effects on the number of children. Although the
number of children is inefficiently under-provided in our model, this term does not reflect
the externality-correcting term but is related to the tax-induced price-distortions under a
revenue constraint. To confirm this, we consider the case in which the lump-sum tax is
available; that is, there is virtually no revenue constraint. As shown above, the availability
of the lump-sum tax leads to λ = −1 and hence, the fourth term vanishes.





























> 0, i = m, f,
δ ≡ −(1 + tN )NtN
N
> 0,
where we use the definition of ωi(≡ (1−ti)wi).39 ηi is the (after-tax) wage elasticity of labor
supply and εi the (after-tax) wage elasticity of childcare time. Since ωi is the opportunity
cost of hi, the definition of εi is multiplied by −1. θi is the wage elasticity of the number
of children and involves the effect of ωi on N through the determination of N in the second
stage. δ can be interpreted as the price elasticity of the number of children through the
determination of N in the second stage. Note that all elasticities are defined as positive





(1 + tN )pNN
(1− ti)wili
, i = m, f. (55)
αihl is the ratio between the after-tax labor income and the value of childcare evaluated by
39Note that NtN (≡ ∂N/∂tN ) = pN (∂N/∂(1 + tN )pN ). Thus, δ is the price elasticity of the number of
children.
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the opportunity cost, and αiNl is the expenditure share of the childcare expenses on the








Note the following three points concerning the definitions of ri. First, from the definition of
ri, we observe that ∂ri/∂ti = 1/(1− ti)2 > 0 and that ∂rN/∂tN = 1/(1+ tN )2 > 0. Second,
allowing for the first property, we observe that tm ⋛ tf ⇐⇒ rm ⋛ rf . Third, the sign of
ri is the same as that of ti since ti < 1 for i = m, f while the sign of rN is the same as
that of tN since tN > −1. In addition, since the optimal tax expressions of ri and rN are
very simple and intuitive, we treat the optimal tax expressions of ri and rN to examine the
properties and structure of the optimal taxation.
Using (54)–(56), (52) and (53) are transformed by the following optimal tax formula,
respectively (see Appendix G).



















+ (1 + µ) (1− β)αfhlεf
ηf
, (58)




The elasticity ηi, which is in the denominator, is related to the price-distortions between
the consumption of the numeraire and the working time. The optimal income tax rate ri
becomes lower as the value of ηi increases relative to the other elasticities and the expenditure





and αmhl = α
f
hl. In this case, from (57) and (58), we observe that rm ⋛ rf ⇐⇒ ηm ⋚ ηf :
the higher tax rate should be imposed on the income of the spouse with the smaller wage
elasticities of labor supply, which implies that the optimal gender-based taxation involves
Ramsey’s inverse elasticity rule (Boskin and Sheshinski, 1983).
εi is related to the corrective effects on under-investment in childcare and the sub-
optimally low fertility, since an improvement of the childcare time improves the inefficient
fertility level. The income taxes on spouse i correct the inefficiently low childcare time due
to non-cooperative behavior, as shown by (23). This means that the income taxation has
a double dividend: it can increase tax revenue as well as correct the low fertility caused
40Note that 1 − β > 0, since λ < 0. We numerically confirm that β is also positive in the numerical
examples provided in Section 7, regardless of the availability of a childcare facility.
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by non-cooperative behavior. Thus, as shown by (57) and (58), the optimal income tax
rate ri becomes higher as εi is larger, ceteris paribus. Concerning the relative tax rates,
we observe that rm ⋛ rf ⇐⇒ εm ⋛ εf if the other elasticities and all the shares are equal
between a wife and husband. Another implication is that the corrective effect of income
taxes should be considered as being more important as µ increases. Because NQ becomes
a more important factor in social welfare when the value of µ is larger, more time spent on
childcare should be induced by the higher income taxes to improve Q and then N . When
the value of µ is larger, NQ becomes a more important factor in social welfare. This implies
that the policymaker considers that inefficiencies arising from non-cooperative behavior are
their primary target. Thus, more time on childcare should be induced by the higher income
taxes to improve Q and then N . This differs from the result under the cooperative setting
in that the optimal design of income taxation takes account of the external effect of children
on society. Indeed, if εi = 0 (i.e., it corresponds to the cooperative setting), the externality
(µ) does not affect the optimal income tax rate on each spouse.
Next, we discuss the relationship between the optimal income taxes and the elasticity
θi/δ. Since θi expresses the effect of the income tax on the number of children and 1/δ the
effect of the number of children on the child tax/subsidy, we observe that θi/δ reflects the
effects of the income tax (ti for i = m, f) on the child tax/subsidy (tN ) through the change
in the number of children (N). As shown by (28) and (29), the increase in ti (i = m, f)
raises N , which leads to the increase in tN owing to the rise in tax base of tN . Thus, we
observe that the increase in tN partially reduces N and hence, can mitigate the deadweight
loss of labor supply from (17). Therefore, as θi/δ becomes larger, the optimal income tax
rate ti becomes higher. If the lump-sum tax is available (i.e., β = 0), the consideration is
not needed under optimal taxation.





> 0, i = m, f. (59)
χi denotes the elasticity of working time in the outside labor market with respect to the
number of children. Using (26), (50) can be rewritten as
tN : 0 = −(1 + λ)pNNN−1tN − λ(tmwmlmN + tfwf lfN + tNpN ) (60)
+ (1− tm)wmlmN + (1− tf )wf lfN − (1 + tN )pN
− (2 + µ)ρ(1− tm)wmlmN − (2 + µ)(1− ρ)(1− tf )wf lfN
+ [(2 + µ)(1− ρ)− 1]c′ + (2 + µ)[(1− ρ)(1− γ) + ργ](1 + tN )pN .
Applying (54)–(56) and (59) to (60), we present the optimal child tax/subsidy expression
in the following proposition (see Appendix H).
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[1− (2 + µ)ρ] χm
αmNl






[1− (2 + µ)(1− ρ)] c′
(1 + tN )pN
+ {1− (2 + µ) [(1− ρ)(1− γ) + ργ]} .
The first term β/δ in (61) reflects its own price distortion on the number of children,
that is, the Ramsey tax implication: the direct child tax/subsidy rate should be inversely
proportional to the own-price elasticity δ. The second and third terms are related to the
effect of tN on the deadweight loss created by income taxes tm and tf , respectively, through
the change in the number of children. Noticing that χi(≡ −NliN/li) includes liN and that
χi is multiplied by the tax rate ri, we observe that riχi/α
i
Nl reflects the effects of tN on
the price-distortions on the labor supply of spouse i through the change in the number of
children. Since the larger value of χi reflects the larger response of li due to the change in
N , the larger χi implies that the increase in the child tax makes the income tax-induced
deadweight loss smaller. Thus, as the second and third terms increase, child taxes tend to
become more desirable. The last term Λ allows for bargaining power between the spouses
ρ and the government’s weight on children µ. As β, which is related to the required tax
revenue, increases (decreases), the first term should be valued more (less) than the fourth
term for characterizing the optimal child tax/subsidy.
To obtain an intuition of the optimal child tax/subsidy more clearly, let us consider the
case in which ρ = 0.5 and µ = 0. In this case, Λ|ρ=0.5, µ=0 = 0; that is, Λ is generated
when the weights are different between the spouses in the couple’s utility function (ρ ̸= 0.5)
or when the government regards children as being more important than parents’ utility
(µ ̸= 0). The role of ρ and µ in characterizing the optimal tax structure is explained later.











As shown above, if the lump-sum tax is available for the government, β(≡ (1 + λ)/λ) = 0
and hence, β/δ in (63) vanishes. This is because, as mentioned above, β/δ is related to
the price-distortion effect of the number of children under a revenue constraint. However,
even if the lump-sum tax is available, (63) shows that the child tax/subsidy is not zero: the
optimal intervention for a child is unambiguously to impose a tax. The income taxes act
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as a device to correct under-investment in childcare and hence, improve the sub-optimally
low fertility through the enhancement of the quality per child. However, income taxation
reduces the aggregate working time li + hi, which implies the occurrence of the deadweight
loss. To partially repress the distortions, the optimal intervention for children is to impose
a tax, because the child tax lowers N , as shown by (30), and the decreases in N raises li,
as shown by (17).
Here, we clarify the roles of the income taxes and the direct child tax/subsidy to correct
the inefficiently low fertility caused by non-cooperative behavior of the spouses. Assuming












From this result and Proposition 2(i), we undoubtedly observe that income taxation, but
not direct child subsidy, plays the role of correcting the low fertility arising from under-
investment in childcare due to non-cooperative behavior of the spouses. Income taxes can
directly correct the inefficient decision on childcare time, hi, and hence, enhance the low
fertility, N , by improving the quality per child, Q. However, the direct child subsidy can-
not create such effects. Thus, the income taxes are more effective policy instruments for
improving low fertility stemming from non-cooperative behavior of spouses.
Now, we turn to exploring the implication of the last term Λ, which is related to the
bargaining power between the spouses ρ and the government’s weight on children µ. First, to
focus on the role of the bargaining power, suppose that µ = 0. Then, (62) can be rewritten
as









(1 + tN )pN
+ 2 (0.5− γ)
]
. (65)
















(1 + tN )pN
+ 2 (0.5− γ)
]
. (66)
(see Appendix I). Noting that 1 − ρ > 0, 1 + tN > 0, and c′′ > 0, from (65) and (66), we
observe that






First, we clarify the meaning of (67). Without loss of generality, we assume that ρ > 0.5: the
bargaining power of the husband is larger than that of the wife. In this case, the government
wants to encourage distributions from the husband to the wife because the weights on the
41∂N/∂ρ is independent of µ, because N is determined by the couple ignoring µ.
29
spouses in the government’s welfare function are equal. If ∂N/∂ρ > (<)0, the husband
wants to increase (decrease) the number of children. Allowing for this fact, the government
increases (decreases) the child tax rate, in the view of distribution between the spouses.
Thus, from (61), the optimal child tax (subsidy) increases with the absolute value of Λ if
Λ > (<)0. This argument holds even in the case in which ρ < 0.5, that is, the wife has more
bargaining power than the husband. When ρ = 0.5, since the weights on the spouses are
equal between the couple’s utility and the government’s welfare functions, the government
does not need to encourage distribution caused by the difference of the weights. Thus, if
ρ = 0.5, Λ|µ=0 = 0.
Next, we explore the determinants of the sign of ∂N/∂ρ. The sign of ∂N/∂ρ depends





′/(1 + tN )pN , and 2 (0.5− γ) in (66) since c′′(1−





speaking, if the increase in the number of childrenN reduces labor supply of spouse i, χi/α
i
Nl
becomes large, because χi includes liN . The labor supply reduction of each spouse is harmful
for him/her because it reduces his/her private consumption, while a part of labor supply
reduction is used for childcare and leads to the improvement of the quality of children, which




Nl > 0 holds.
This implies a larger reduction of the labor supply of the wife. Under this condition, the
husband wants to increase the number of children in the second stage because the increase
in N benefits him without a large reduction of his private consumption. Thus, an increase in




Nl > 0 contributes
to an increase in the number of children. The second term c′/(1 + tN )pN describes the
allowance for the cost incurred by a wife. As the bargaining power of the husband ρ is large,
the number of children increases, because the cost c(N) is irrelevant to the husband.42 The
final term relates to the cost burden of bringing up children. If 0.5 > γ (i.e., if the smaller
cost burden for the expense of bringing up children is imposed on the husband), then the
husband wants to increase the number of children and the increase in ρ leads to the increase
of N .
Finally, we discuss the parameter of the externality of children on society µ in the optimal
child tax/subsidy. To clarify the effects of µ in (61), we consider the case in which ρ = 0.5






















(1 + tN ) pN
]
. (68)
42As shown in the third term in (68) and the fourth term in (94), the marginal cost of the number of
children c′ contributes to the lower tax rate (higher subsidy rate). To improve the fertility rate, the direct
child tax should be reduced. We confirm that the optimal child tax rate decreases with c′ and it can become
a subsidy if c′ is sufficiently large.
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Except for the second term whose sign is positive, we observe that the direct child tax/subsidy
depends on the Ramsey consideration, which allows for the price distortion in the revenue-
constrained optimal tax framework, and the Pigou consideration, which allows for the ex-
ternality correction. The former is shown by the first term, which includes β, and the latter
is shown by the third term, which includes µ. The first term is positive, while the third term
is negative. Thus, if the required tax revenue is larger than the external effect of children on
society (i.e., the Ramsey consideration dominates the Pigou consideration), the first term
becomes larger than the third term and hence, the direct child tax is likely to be optimal.
However, even if the required tax revenue is smaller than the external effect of children on
society (i.e., the Ramsey consideration is dominated by the Pigou consideration), it does
not necessarily lead to the direct child subsidy owing to the presence of the second term.
From (68), we observe that if µ is sufficiently large, the sign of rN is also likely to be
negative: the optimal intervention for children is likely to be a subsidy as µ becomes larger.



















(1 + tN ) pN
]
. (69)
If µ/2 ≥ max[rm, rf ], the optimal childcare policy ambiguously becomes a subsidy.
6 Childcare Facility
In this section, we introduce center-based childcare services, such as early childhood edu-
cation facilities, preschools, and cram schools, as an educational investment by a couple.
This can be substituted for the childcare time of each spouse. Let us denote the number of
hours that children spend in a childcare facility by hc. In this model, although the couple
collectively decides the time children spend in the childcare facility as well as the number of
children, those decisions are not made simultaneously.43 We modify the sequential decisions
of the government, the couple, and each spouse, as follows: first, the government determines
the tax rates; second, the couple collectively decides on the number of children; third, the
couple collectively decides the time children spend in the childcare facility; and finally, each
spouse non-cooperatively decides his/her two kinds of private consumption, labor supply in
the external market, and time spent on domestic childcare.44
43Due to the long-term nature of bringing up children, the decision on the number of children that a couple
will have is made prior to the use of a childcare facility. This leads to the possibility that time use of the
childcare facility may deviate from what is planned today, that is, couples do not commit to one deemed
optimal from the current perspective. Therefore, we consider that the couple decides time use of the childcare
facility at the next stage after they choose the number of children.
44Even if we change the order of the third (hc) and fourth decisions (li and hi) is reversed, our main
qualitative results are unaffected. This is because li and hi (i = m, f) are separable with hc in the utility
functions.
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where sc is the productivity of a childcare facility.
45 To simplify the analysis, we assume
that the curvature of the quality function σ on the time children spend in the childcare
facility is the same as that on childcare time spent by each spouse.46 The budget constraint
of each spouse is modified by
zi + (1 + ty)pyyi + γi(1 + tN )pNN + νi(1 + tc)pchc = (1− ti)wili, i = m, f. (71)
The expenditure on the childcare facility is given by the fourth term on the left-hand side,
in which νi is the share of spouse i on the expense of the childcare facility, pc is the hourly
price, and tc is the tax/subsidy rate on the use of the childcare facility. Defining νm ≡ ν
(and hence, νf ≡ 1− ν) and substituting (70) for Q in (1) and (71) for zi in (1) yields
Um = (1− tm)wmlm − (1 + ty)pyym − γ(1 + tN )pNN +
yφm
φ
− ν(1 + tc)pchc (72)


















Uf = (1− tf )wf lf − (1 + ty)pyyf − (1− γ)(1 + tN )pNN +
yφf
φ
− (1− ν)(1 + tc)pchc
−


















The difference of each spouse’s utility function between the cases with and without the
childcare facility is the expenditure on the childcare facility (fifth term) and the contribution
of the childcare facility on the quality per child (third term in square brackets). We should
note that, because yi, li and hi are additively separable with respect to hc in each spouse’s
utility function, the first-order conditions of each spouse with respect to yi, li, and hi are
identical to (10), (11), and (12) and hence, equations (13)–(24) hold even in the model with
the childcare facility. This fact is used in the following analysis.
45Bastani et al. (2020) consider the quality of a childcare facility as a choice variable of parents. For
simplicity, we do not endogenously treat the choice of quality of formal care. If our model extends to such a
setting, sc is an endogenous variable and pc is a strictly increasing convex function of sc.
46The difference between home care productivity for each spouse and the quality of the childcare facility
is indicated by the difference between si and sc. Although we check numerical results for how an increase in
sc affects optimal tax/subsidy structures while keeping siconstant, we omit the results because the intuition
of the results is very straightforward.
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As mentioned above, the spouses collectively maximize U firstly with respect to N and next
with respect to hc. We first show the determination of hc of the couple. The first-order




= − [(1− ρ)(1− ν) + ρν] (1 + tc)pc +N1−σsσc hσ−1c . (74)
Solving this equation with respect to hc, we immediately obtain the following function:





























c > 0. (77)
The intuitions for the two results are very straightforward.
We now turn to the couple’s decision about the number of children. Allowing for hc =
hc(tc, N), the couple maximizes the utility function (73) with respect to N . The first-order
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[(1− ρ)(1− ν) + ρν] (1 + tc)pchcN (tc),
where we use (14), (15), (17), (74), and (77) for the derivation of this equation (see Appendix
J). (78) implies
N = N(tc, tN , tm, tf ). (79)
Here, we propose the effects of each tax rate on the number of children. Totally differenti-



































































where ωc ≡ (1+ tc)pc. To derive these four equations, we use (17) and (77). (80), (81), and
(82) coincide with (28), (29), and (30), respectively. The intuition of these results is discussed
below (28), (29), and (30), respectively. The intuition of (83) is very straightforward, because
the increase in tc reduces the time children spend in the childcare facility, which means that
it worsens the quality per child and then leads to lower fertility.
Substituting (79) for N in (14), (15), and (75) yields
li(ti, N(tc, tN , tm, tf )), hi(ti, N(tc, tN , tm, tf )), i = m, f, (84)
hc(tc, N(tc, tN , tm, tf )).
These functions involve information of the decision process in the second, third, and fourth
stages.
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Substituting (72) for Ui in (8) and allowing for (13), (79), and (84), we obtain the
government’s welfare function:






(lm(tm, N(tc, tN , tm, tf )) + hm(tm, N(tc, tN , tm, tf )))
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ





(lf (tf , N(tc, tN , tm, tf )) + hf (tf , N(tc, tN , tm, tf )))
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
− (1 + ty)py(ym(ty) + yf (ty))− c(N(tc, tN , tm, tf ))
− (1 + tN )pNN(tc, tN , tm, tf )− (1 + tc)pchc(tc, N(tc, tN , tm, tf ))
+ (2 + µ)(N(tc, tN , tm, tf ))
1−σ
[













The revenue constraint of the government is modified by
R = tmwmlm(tm, N(tc, tN , tm, tf )) + tfwf lf (tf , N(tc, tN , tm, tf )) (86)
+ typy (ym(ty) + yf (ty)) + tNpNN(tc, tN , tm, tf ) + tcpchc(tc, N(tc, tN , tm, tf )),
where the fifth term is the tax revenue from the tax/subsidy on the use of the childcare fa-
cility. From the government’s social welfare maximization subject to the revenue constraint,
we obtain the optimal tax expressions for ty, tm, tf , tN , and tc. Before characterizing them,








(1 + tN )pNN
(1 + tc)pchc
> 0, χc ≡
hcNN
hc




δc is the price elasticity of time use of a childcare facility, ξ is the elasticity of the number of
children with respect to the price of external childcare services, αNhc is the ratio between
the expenditure on fertility good and childcare expenditure, and χc is the elasticity of time
use of a childcare facility with respect to the number of children.47
From the conditions and equations shown in this section, we provide the following opti-
47Note that hctc(≡ ∂hc/∂tc) = pc(∂hc/∂(1 + tc)pc). Thus, δc is the price elasticity of external childcare
services. Similarly, Ntc(≡ ∂N/∂tc) = pc(∂N/∂(1 + tc)pc). In other words, ξ is the elasticity of the number
of children with respect to the price of external childcare services.
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mal tax formulae in the case with a childcare facility (see Appendix K).














































+ (1− β) {1− (2 + µ) [(1− ρ)(1− ν) + ρν]} , (92)
where
Ω ≡ Λ + {1− (2 + µ) [(1− ρ)(1− ν) + ρν]} χc
αNhc
. (93)
Comparing Proposition 6 with Propositions 4, we observe that the optimal commodity
and income tax expressions are identical to the expressions in the case without a childcare
facility. The fourth term in (91) newly appears in the optimal child tax/subsidy expression.
The interpretation of the term is similar to that of the second and third terms, whose
intuition is discussed below Proposition 5. rcχc/αNhc reflects the effects of tN on the price-
distortions on hc through the change in N . If rc < (>)0, as the fourth term is larger, the
child taxes (subsidies) tend to be desirable. However, since χc = 1, the absolute value of the
fourth term depends on rc, ceteris paribus αNhc . The second term in Ω also newly appears
in the optimal child tax/subsidy expression and its intuition is similar to the first term in
Λ, which is given by (62).
Next, we check the expression in the optimal tax/subsidy for center-based childcare
services. The denominator in the first term shows the Ramsey tax implication. If ξ = 0,
the first term is reduced to the standard Ramsey expression β/δc. ξ/δ describes the effect
of the change in tc on tN through the change in N . The increase in tc lowers N , which
leads to the decrease in tN because of the reduction of tax base for tN . The decrease in tN
raises N again and hence, exacerbates the deadweight loss in labor supply. Therefore, as
ξ/δ becomes larger, the optimal subsidy (tax) for center-based childcare services becomes
higher (lower). The second term in (92) is related to bargaining power between the spouses
and the weight on the children. Although this term reflects the corrections for hc deviating
from a socially desirable level due to the external effect of children or the difference of the
36
weights on the spouses between the social welfare function and the couple’s utility function,
the intuition of this term is similar to that of the third term of Λ in expression (61), which
is discussed below Proposition 5.
Some important and suggestive results are obtained from the optimal tax/subsidy ex-
pression on center-based childcare services. Consider the case in which ν = γ, that is, the
shares of each spouse are equal between two kinds of child expenditure. In this case, we
obtain the following optimal tax expressions (see Appendix L).










+ (1− β)Λ, (94)
rc = (1− β){1− (2 + µ)[(1− ρ)(1− ν) + ρν]}. (95)
Comparing Proposition 7 with (61) in Proposition 5, we observe that if ν = γ, the
optimal child tax/subsidy expression is identical irrespective of whether there is a childcare
facility. When the condition is satisfied, the fourth term in (91) and the second term in
(93) cancel out, which stems from the fact that the first term on the right-hand side of
(92) vanishes. As shown in Appendix L, if ν = γ, the first term in (92) disappears, since
the positive effect of tc on revenue requirement (β) offsets the negative effect of tc on labor
supply through the change in N (−βαNhc
ξ
δ ).
48 As a result, we obtain (95). In this case,
we observe that the fourth term in (91) and the second term in (93) cancel out. Thus, the
optimal child tax/subsidy expression in (61) is replicated. This result implies that the only
role of the direct child subsidy allowing for a choice of center-based childcare services is to
alleviate the inefficiently downward distortion on hc due to the effect of tc as revenue-raising
taxes, where we consider that the first term in (92) is positive.
Meanwhile, if ν = γ, the optimal tax formula for rc is expressed by (95). Furthermore,





The optimal intervention in the childcare facility is to unambiguously provide a subsidy to
correct the external effect of children on society (NQ) as long as µ > 0. As the subsidy for
center-based childcare services increases the time devoted to a childcare facility, it improves
the quality per child and hence, enhances the number of children. This is consistent with
Bastani et al. (2017), and shows that the subsidy for external childcare services acts as a
means for internalizing externalities associated with the external effect of children on society
and then improves the human capital accumulation of children.





Noting that ν = γ, from (94) and (95), we observe that











[1− (2 + µ)ρ] χm
αmNl
(97)




[1− (2 + µ)(1− ρ)]c′
(1 + tN )pN
}
.
First, we observe that a high revenue requirement raises the weight on the first term on the
right-hand side (β) and decreases the weight on the fourth term (1 − β), ceteris paribus.
In particular, if ρ = 0.5, the fourth term increases with β, since the sign of the term is
negative. In addition, since the optimal income tax rates depend on β from (89) and (90),
the change in the revenue requirement affects the second and third terms on the right-hand
side. However, it is ambiguous whether the revenue-raising position of the government
increases or decreases the second and third terms. This is because, in our model, income
taxes are not only revenue-raising taxes but also Pigou taxes. An increase in β strengthens
the revenue-raising purpose and weakens the corrective-raising purpose, which means that
it is unclear whether income tax rates increase or decrease. Thus, if ρ = 0.5 and income
tax rates increase with β, the optimal tax/subsidy structure is more likely to be such that
rN > (<)rc as the required tax revenue is higher (lower). In addition, we observe that the
second and third terms increase and the fourth term decreases with the external effect of
children on society µ, ceteris paribus. This means that an increase in µ not only strongly
requires the role of tN as a subsidy to correct the externality of children on society but
also reinforces the role of tN as a tax to mitigate the distortionary impact on labor supply
associated with the income taxes, as shown by (89) and (90). As a result, whether tN or
tc should be taxed/subsidized at a higher rate depends on the two effects of µ working in
opposite directions. These results are confirmed in the numerical analysis in Section 7.
Finally, we clarify the role of each policy instrument to correct the inefficiently low
fertility arising from non-cooperative behavior within a couple. Propositions 6 and 7 show










> 0, rc = 0. (98)
The optimal income taxes and the direct child tax/subsidy are identical to those in (64),
and the intuitions follow those below (64). Note that no intervention in the childcare
facility is optimal. As shown in (83), the subsidy for center-based childcare services can
improve fertility, but it is not necessary under optimal taxation. Both income taxes and the
subsidy for center-based childcare services improve the quality per child and then enhance
the number of children. However, the income taxes directly correct the inefficient choice
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of hi, while the subsidy for center-based childcare services intervenes in the choice of hc
efficiently decided by the couple. In other words, the subsidy for the services merely distorts
the quality per child upwardly. Therefore, income taxes are more effective than the subsidy
for center-based childcare services under optimal taxation.
Furthermore, notice that the direct child tax is needed to mitigate income tax-induced
deadweight loss whereas the tax on external childcare services is redundant. The intuitive
interpretation for this result is as follows. From (17), (82), and (83), both taxes on the
number of children and external childcare services enable the government to mitigate price-
distortions on labor supply induced by income taxation through the change in the number
of children. However, from (76), the tax on external childcare services directly distorts
the time use of center-based childcare services efficiently decided by the couple. For this
reason, the tax on external childcare services is not required to mitigate income tax-induced
deadweight loss.
7 Numerical Analysis
This section numerically examines the optimal tax structure in the presence of the childcare
facility when some important and suggestive parameters vary. The numerical analysis rein-
forces the intuition of our theoretical results and provides important policy implications. We
consider the variations of the parameters µ, s(≡ sm = sf ), R, wm, and ρ, where a change in
s means that sm and sf change simultaneously keeping sm = sf . The variations of µ, s, and
R clarify the structure of the direct child tax/subsidy and the tax/subsidy for the center-
based childcare services, and those of wm and ρ are undertaken to examine the gender-based
income taxation under the asymmetric spouses. To make the analysis tractable, we specify
the function c(N) and the parameters as follows: c(N) = N2/2, φ = 0.2, σ = γ = ν = 0.5,
ϕ = 1.0, wf = pc = 4.0, sc = 1.2 and py = pN = 1.0.
49 In this case, tN and tc under the
optimal taxation are given by (94) and (96), respectively. Then, (78) yields






(1 + ρ) s
4(1− ρ)(1− tf )
+
3
5(1− ρ)(1 + tc)
, (99)





(1 + ρ) s





, Ntc = −
3
5(1− ρ)(1 + tc)2
.
49Since the labor-intensity of center-based childcare services are very high, we assume that pc equals the
wage rate wi.
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As a benchmark case, we consider the symmetric case between the spouses, in which µ = 0.2,
R = 5.0, wm = 4, s = 1.2, and ρ = 0.5. Unless otherwise noted, we consider these values
under which the spouses are symmetric. We make use of these numerical values of the
parameters, (99), and (100), in numerically deriving the optimal tax formulae in Proposition
7.
7.1 Child Subsidy
We first investigate how the external effects of children on society µ affect the optimal tax
structure. Table 1 demonstrates the optimal tax rates when µ takes the values from 0 to
0.3 with an interval of 0.05. The optimal income tax rates are always the same between
the spouses, tm = tf , because of spousal symmetry. As the external effect of children on
society becomes large, the income taxes, child tax/subsidy, and tax/subsidy on/for external
childcare services should play a stronger role in improving child quality and hence, increasing
the number of children. To do so, the income tax rates increase with the externality to
increase childcare time and hence, improve child quality; the subsidy rate for center-based
childcare services increases with the externality to promote time use of childcare facilities
and hence, improves child quality; then, the child tax rate decreases with the externality to
directly enhance the number of children. To secure tax revenues for subsidies for external
childcare services and to compensate for a deficit in revenue due to a decrease in the child
tax, commodity taxes as well as income taxes increase with the external effect of children.

















































Table 1 shows that the optimal intervention for children tends to be a subsidy if the exter-
nality of children on society is sufficiently large. The condition implies that the externality
of children on society is a more important factor of sub-optimally low fertility than the
non-cooperative behavior of the couple. By contrast, if the non-cooperative behavior of
the spouses is the main causes of under-providing for children, the direct child subsidy
worsens welfare. Although the direct child tax decreases and the subsidy for center-based
childcare services increases with the external effect of children, the difference between these
tax/subsidy rates becomes smaller as µ becomes larger. The related discussion is provided
below Table 3.
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Table 2 shows the proportional changes in s from sm = sf on the optimal tax structure.
The increase in s leads to more inefficiencies due to the non-cooperative behavior of the
couple. Since each spouse does not consider that his/her own childcare time positively
affects the partner’s utility, a higher level of s implies a larger loss arising from the external
effect of the couple. Table 2 shows that the optimal income tax rates increase with s: the
low fertility caused by non-cooperative behavior should be improved by the income taxation.
The commodity tax rate decreases with s. This stems from the double dividend of income
taxation, which increases tax revenue as well as corrects the non-cooperative behavior. The
numerical results are consistent with the interpretation of Proposition 4.

















































Next, we examine the effects of the required tax revenue level on the optimal tax struc-
ture. Since γ = ν = 0.5, the optimal child tax/subsidy is given by (94). As discussed below
(94), if the required tax revenue is relatively small (large), the direct child subsidy (tax) is
likely to be optimal. Table 3 demonstrates the optimal tax rates when R takes the values
from 3.5 to 5.3 with an interval of 0.3. The optimal income taxes and the direct child tax
increase, and the subsidy rate for external childcare services decreases with the required tax
revenue. The tax changes are intuitive.
The numerical results in Tables 1 and 3 yield important policy implications for the child
tax/subsidy. If the required tax revenue becomes sufficiently large or the external effect
of children on society becomes sufficiently small, the price-distortion effect in an optimal
tax framework is more likely to dominate the corrective effect on sub-optimally low fertility
stemming from the externality of children on society. Thus, the direct child subsidy becomes
optimal if the required tax revenue is relatively small or if the external effect of children on
41
society is relatively large.

















































The most important finding is as follows. The ranking of the direct child subsidy rate
and the subsidy rate for center-based childcare services are switched with the required tax
revenue. As shown by (97), the sign of (tN − tc) is determined by price-distortions under a
revenue constraint (first term), the income tax-induced distortion on labor supply (second
and third terms), and the external effect of children on society (fourth term). As the requited
tax revenue becomes large, the optimal taxes/subsidies must put weight on price-distortions
under a revenue constraint and the income tax-induced distortion on labor supply more than
the external effect of children on society. Thus, as the required tax revenue becomes large,
the ranking of these subsidy rates is switched. As a policy recommendation, the welfare
state in a developed country, in which a huge amount of tax revenue is needed because the
government size is generally large, should design its tax/subsidy system so that the subsidy
rate for center-based childcare services is higher than the direct child subsidy rate, even if the
direct child subsidy is optimal. However, in developing countries, where the government’s
size is generally small, the direct child subsidy rate should be higher than the subsidy rate
for center-based childcare services.
Finally, Table 4 shows the rate of welfare gain and the increase in fertility rate owing to
the full utilization of childcare facilities. Unambiguously, they are improved by the intro-
duction of childcare facilities. The result is confirmed by almost all values of the parameters.
The improvement and expansion of childcare facilities are effective for enhancing the fertil-
ity rate and welfare. Allowing for the result in Table 1, we observe that the improvement
and expansion of childcare facilities have higher priority than the child tax/subsidy, and the
government should implement the subsidy for center-based childcare services after develop-
ing a large number of childcare facilities. If non-cooperative behavior of spouses is the main
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cause of under-provision for children, then the direct child subsidy worsens welfare.

























Ŵ : the rate of welfare gain, Ñ : the difference in the number of children
7.2 Gender-Based Income Taxation
Here, we treat asymmetric cases between spouses to examine gender-based taxation. The
wage rate and bargaining power of spouses vary. First, we consider the variation of the wage
rate of the husband, while keeping the wage rate of the wife constant: wm takes the values
from 3.4 to 4.6 with an interval of 0.2. The case of wm = 4 is the benchmark case, as shown
in the third column from the right of Table 1. The optimal tax rates in this case are given
in Table 5.

















































All tax rates decrease with the wage rate of the husband. The increase in the wage rate wm
implies the expansion of the tax base and hence, the required tax revenue can be attained
at the lower tax rates. Another finding is that the optimal income tax rate on the husband
is lower (higher) than that on the wife if wm > (<)wf . This is contrary to the Ramsey
inverse elasticity rule, which is that the higher tax rate should be imposed on the spouse
with smaller wage elasticity, that is, with higher productivity (Boskin and Sheshinski, 1983).
In the model with time spent on childcare, the income taxation motivates workers to reduce
more labor supply in the external market. If the husband has higher productivity than the
wife, the government has an incentive for the husband to work more in the external labor
market to enhance economic efficiency, while the wife engages more in childcare activities
(Meier and Rainer, 2015). Thus, the optimal income tax rate on the husband is lower
(higher) than that of the wife if wm > (<)wf .
50
50We examine the optimal tax structure when the childcare productivity of husband sm varies from 0.9
to 1.5 with interval 0.1, keeping sf constant. The increase (decrease) in sm has the reverse impact of the
increase (decrease) in wm on time allocation of li and hi. Therefore, the relative size between the optimal
43
Next, we consider the variation of the bargaining power of the spouse ρ in the decision
about the number of children. Table 6 shows the optimal tax rates in the case in which ρ
takes from 0.65 to 0.35 with interval 0.05. As the value of ρ becomes smaller, the optimal
income tax rates on both spouses increases, while the optimal child tax rate decreases.

















































As ρ becomes smaller (i.e., (1−ρ) becomes larger), the cost c(N) becomes a more important
factor in the couple’s decision about the number of children. As children impose a burden
on the wife, the larger bargaining power of the wife leads to fewer children.51 To repress
this effect and to increase the number of children, the child tax rate decreases with ρ and it
becomes a subsidy if ρ is sufficiently small. The optimal income tax rates on both spouses
increases with ρ to improve the number of children from the above reason and to secure
funds for the child subsidy.
Another feature of income tax rates is as follows: the spouse with higher bargaining
power should be taxed at a lower rate. Without loss of generality, consider a situation in
which ρ is greater than 0.5. In this case, the government intends to decrease the number
of children, since the couple decides to have more children because they disregard the cost
c(N) for a wife. To this end, from Proposition 2(iii), it is more effective to reduce the
income tax rates on the wife more than that on husband. However, there are disadvantages
of lower income taxes on wife: Proposition 2(iii) shows that the couple decides to have
fewer children and hence, this greatly reduces parents’ childcare time from (17). This
means that under-investment in childcare worsens. Thus, the lower income tax rate on
the wife brings stronger downward pressure on child quality than a lower income tax rate
on the husband does. As a result, the government must allow for the two forces working
in opposite directions when differentiating the income tax rates between spouses. Table
6 suggests that the government should set lower income tax rates on the husband, which
implies that the government should emphasize maintaining the quality of children over
correcting for the intra-family distribution through the decline in fertility. Lise and Yamada
(2019) empirically show that the bargaining power of men is higher than that of women,
ρ > 0.5. In that case, our numerical result shows that a higher income tax rate should be
tax rates tm and tf is opposite to that in Table 5.
51This is consistent with the empirical results of Ashraf et al. (2014).
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imposed on the wife than on the husband.
8 Conclusion
This study analyzes the optimal taxation in an economy with non-cooperative couples, in-
cluding gender-based income taxation, commodity tax, child tax/subsidy, and a tax/subsidy
on/for external childcare services. The number of children is at a sub-optimally low level in
the economy for two reasons: the first is the externality of children on society and the sec-
ond is non-cooperative household behavior. To model our scenario, we separate the quality
per child and the number of children. As the time spent on childcare cannot be credibly
committed across spouses and hence, the behavior of a couple becomes non-cooperative,
the quality per child is sub-optimally low. Meanwhile, the number of children and the time
children spend in a childcare facility are collectively decided by a couple.
This study proves that non-cooperative household behavior regarding the amount of
childcare leads to a sub-optimally low number of children, which is consistent with the
empirical evidence (Doepke and Kindermann, 2019). This study makes the following sug-
gestions to improve the low fertility rate under a revenue constraint. First, sub-optimally
low fertility stemming from non-cooperative behavior should be corrected by income taxes,
not a child subsidy. As long as the externality of children on society is sufficiently small,
a child tax is desirable to mitigate the distortionary impact of income taxes on labor sup-
ply. In this situation, the child subsidy should be reduced or removed, since it worsens
welfare. Second, as the externality of children on society becomes larger, the income tax
rate and the subsidy for external childcare service increase, while the direct child tax de-
creases. According to the first and second arguments, if a low fertility rate is caused by
both the non-cooperative behavior of spouses and the externality of children on society, the
government faces the problem of designing appropriate family policies corresponding to the
two driving forces behind the inefficiently low fertility. As the external effect of children
on society becomes less (more) serious, the government should design the tax system with
a lower (higher) income tax rate, a child tax (subsidy), and a lower (higher) subsidy for
external childcare services to implement effective policies. Third, our numerical analysis
shows that the full utilization of childcare facilities is an effective policy, rather than the
child tax/subsidy, to improve the fertility rate and welfare. This finding supports policies
that provide public childcare, which are notably implemented by the countries with higher
fertility rates (e.g., France, Norway, and Belgium). Finally, we recommend that developed
countries should employ higher subsidy rates for center-based childcare services than direct
child subsidy rates, while developing countries should implement the opposite policy.
Some extensions are left for our future research. First, since our model considers a
representative household and linear tax/subsidy instruments, it does not clarify whether all
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tax/subsidy instruments, including gender-based income taxation, the direct child tax/subsidy,
and the tax/subsidy on/for center-based childcare services, should be regressive, propor-
tional, or progressive with respect to family size and earnings. To explore the optimal design
of such policies under non-cooperative couple’s behavior, we aim to extend our model to the
Mirrleesian framework with non-linear schedules of these tax/subsidy instruments. Second,
we abstract from the effect of parents’ human capital accumulation on the amount of time
they spend with their children. As mentioned in Gobbi (2018), the American Time Use Sur-
vey for the years 2003–2013 shows that the amount of the time invested by parents increases
with their education. This may imply that subsidies for higher education have significant
returns on children’s human capital being inefficiently low due to non-cooperative behavior
within a couple. Thus, it may be valuable to take into account the effect of education sub-
sidies through such a channel on children’s human capital in order to suggest implications
for applied tax/subsidy policies. Finally, we adopt a quasilinear utility function to avoid
analytical complexity. It would be interesting to derive policy implications under a utility
function with income effect, which may reduce the fertility rate by increasing the income
tax rate.52
Appendix A: The Derivation of (26)
The first-order condition of (25) with respect to N is
0 = ρ(1− tm)wmlmN + (1− ρ)(1− tf )wf lfN − (1− ρ)c′ (A1)



















From (11) and (12), we have
(1− ti)wi = N1−σsσi hσ−1i , i = m, f, (A2)
that is, (1− ti)wihi = N1−σsσi hσi , i = m, f.
From (14) and (17), we observe that hiN = hiN
−1. Using this and (A2), (A1) can be
rewritten as (26).
52The negative relationship between wages and fertility is widespread across time and regions (Jones and
Tertilt, 2008; Baughman and Dickert-Conlin, 2009; Jones et al., 2010) but is not universal. Several studies
have reported exceptional findings. It is sometimes argued that in the early stage of the development process,
there is a positive income–fertility relationship (e.g., Vogl, 2016). The cross-sectional relationship between
fertility and women’s education in the United States has recently become U-shaped (Hazan and Zoabi, 2015).
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Appendix B: The Derivation of (42)




i , i = m, f, (B1)
that is, wihi = 2N
1−σsσi h
σ






















i N, i = m, f. (B3)









pN = 0. (B4)
Moreover, substituting (B2) for hi in (B4) yields (42).
Appendix C: The Proof of π(σ) > 0








ln 2 ≈ 0.69. Define f(σ) ≡ (1 − σ)(2
σ
1−σ − 1) and g(σ) ≡ σ. Obviously, f(0) = g(0) =
















. As a result, limσ→0 π > 0.
Second, we show that π′(σ) > 0 for any 0 < σ < 1, where π′(σ) =
1+2
σ







1−σ ln 2− 1
)
(≡ ψ(σ)) is −1 at σ = 0, it is sufficient to show that
ψ′(σ) > 0 for any 0 < σ < 1. After computation, we obtain ψ′ = 2
σ
1−σ (ln 2)2 σ(1−σ)3 > 0.
Therefore, π′(σ) is positive for any 0 < σ < 1.
Appendix D: The Proof of NPE = NC
In a cooperative setting, the total after-tax income for each spouse is shared between the
husband and wife such that i’s consumption is
zi + γi(1 + tN )pNN = µi [(1− tm)wmlm + (1− tf )wf lf ] , (D1)
where µm + µf = 1.
Given this sharing rule, cooperative couples maximize joint utility (7). Using (D1), the
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maximization problem at the third stage can be rewritten as
max
lm,lf ,hm,hf
U = (ρµm + (1− ρ)µf ) [(1− tm)wmlm + (1− tf )wf lf ] (D2)



























= −ρi (li + hi)ϕ +N1−σsσi hσ−1i , i = m, f. (D4)
These two equations yield
(1− ti)wi = ΓN1−σsσi hσ−1i , i = m, f, (D5)
that is, (1− ti)wihi = ΓN1−σsσi hσi , i = m, f,
where Γ ≡ 1ρµm+(1−ρ)µf . Then, these conditions yield








1−σN, i = m, f, (D6)










1−σN, i = m, f, (D7)
where Θi ≡ ρµm+(1−ρ)µfρi . Note that a similar condition to (17) holds:








1−σ , i = m, f. (D8)
At the second stage, cooperative couples maximize (D2), which is evaluated by h∗i and l
∗
i ,
with respect to N . Using (D8), we can obtain the following first-order condition with respect
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to N :
N : 0 = [ρµm + (1− ρ)µf ]
[
(1− tm)wml∗mN + (1− tf )wf l∗fN
]
(D9)

























By allowing for (D5) and (D8), this can be rewritten as












Using (D6), (D10) can be rewritten as























which yields the number of children under the cooperative case, which is denoted by NC .
If ρ = 1/2 and ti = tN = 0, (D11) coincides with (42), which means that N
PE = NC .
Appendix E: Common Income Tax Rate
In this section, we consider a common income tax rate on the husband and wife instead
of the gender-based taxation. Let us denote the common income tax rate by t. Hence,
tm = tf (≡ t) and dtm = dtf (≡ dt). Except for (28) and (29), note that the equations in
































Given these facts, the government maximizes (45) subject to (46) by choosing t and tN .
Using (17), the first-order conditions with respect to t and tN are
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t : 0 = −wmlm + (1− t)wmlmt + (1− t)wmlmNNt − (lm + hm)ϕ (lmt + hmt) (E2)
− wf lf + (1− t)wf lft + (1− t)wf lfNNt − (lf + hf )ϕ (lft + hft)


















f (hft + hfNNt)
]
− λ (wmlm + wf lf + twmlmt + twf lft + twmlmNNt + twf lfNNt + tNpNNt) ,
tN : 0 = (1− t)wmlmNNtN + (1− t)wf lfNNtN − pNN − (1 + tN )pNNtN (E3)




















− λ (twmlmNNtN + twf lfNNtN + pNN + tNpNNtN ) .
By noting the tm = tf = t, (26) is reduced to














Before providing the proof, we note that all conditions and equations obtained in Sections
3 and 4 are valid as long as the index i of ti is deleted, except for Nt. Furthermore, we provide
the following definitions:
αNl ≡
















, r ≡ t
1− t
, ai ≡ (1− t)wili, i = m, f.
Multiplying each term in (E3) by −N−1tN Nt and applying the resulting equation to (E2)
53We omit the derivation of the optimal commodity tax rate on yi, since the same expression as (51)
obviously holds even under the common income tax rate.
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yields
t : 0 = −wmlm + (1− t)wmlmt − (lm + hm)ϕ (lmt + hmt) (E6)
− wf lf + (1− t)wf lft − (lf + hf )ϕ (lft + hft) + pNNN−1tN Nt












wmlm + wf lf + twmlmt + twf lft − pNNN−1tN Nt
)
Using (11), (A2), and the definition of β, (E6) can be rewritten as
t : 0 = −β (wmlm + wf lf )− (1− β)(1 + µ)(1− t) (wmhmt + wfhft) (E7)





wmlm + wf lf













(1 + µ)(1− t) (wmhmt + wfhft)
(wmlm + wf lf )
]}
.
Using (54), (55), and (E5), we have
wmlm + wf lf




(1− t) (wmhmt + wfhft)






















+ (1− β)(1 + µ)ε
η
. (E12)
The optimal income tax expression under the common tax rate (E12) is similar to the opti-
mal income tax expressions under the gender-based taxation, which is provided in Proposi-
tion 4. η is the weighted average of the wage elasticities of the spouses and ε is the weighted
average of αihlεi, with the weight being the disposable income share of the spouses. The
intuition is similar to Proposition 4.
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Multiplying each term in (E3) by −N−1tN , we obtain
tN : 0 = −(1− t)wmlmN − (1− t)wf lfN + pNNN−1tN + (1 + tN )pN (E13)






















twmlmN + twf lfN + pNNN
−1
tN + pN tN
)
.
Using (17) and (A2), this can be rewritten as
tN : 0 = −(1− t)wmlmN − (1− t)wf lfN + pNNN−1tN + (1 + tN )pN + c
′ (E14)





N−1(1− t)(wmhm + wfhf )
+ (2 + µ)(1− t) (wmlmN + wf lfN )
+ λ
(





Multiplying each term in (E4) by (2 + µ) and making use of (14) and (17) yields
N : 0 = −(2 + µ) [(1− ρ)(1− γ) + ργ] (1 + tN )pN − (2 + µ)(1− ρ)c′





N−1(1− t)(wmhm + wfhf )
− (2 + µ)(1− ρ)(1− t)wmlmN − (2 + µ)ρ(1− t)wf lfN .
Applying this to (E14), we obtain
tN : 0 = (1 + λ)pNNN
−1
tN + {1− (2 + µ) [(1− ρ)(1− γ) + ργ]} (1 + tN )pN (E15)
+ [1− (2 + µ)(1− ρ)]c′ − [1− (2 + µ)ρ] (1− t)wmlmN
− [1− (2 + µ)(1− ρ)](1− t)wf lfN + λ (twmlmN + twf lfN + tNpN ) .










+ (1− β)Λ. (E16)
The expression of the optimal child tax/subsidy takes the same form as (61), regardless of
whether the income tax rates are differentiable or not.
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Appendix F: The Derivations of (52) and (53)
Multiplying each term in (50) by N−1tN Ntm and subtracting the resulting equation from (48)
yields
tm : 0 = −wmlm + (1− tm)wmlmtm − (lm + hm)
ϕ (lmtm + hmtm) (F1)
+ (2 + µ)N1−σsσmh
σ−1
m hmtm − λ (wmlm + tmwmlmtm)
+ (1 + λ)pNNN
−1
tN Ntm .
Using (11) and the first equation in (A2), (F1) can be rewritten as (52), Similarly, we obtain
(53).
Appendix G: The Proof of Proposition 4























































Using (54)–(56), (G1) can be rewritten as (57). Similarly, we obtain (58).
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Appendix H: The Proof of Proposition 5





















(1 + tf )wf lf





[1− (2 + µ)(1− ρ)] c
′




[1− (2 + µ)ρ] (1− tm)wmlm






[1− (2 + µ)(1− ρ)]
(1− tf )wf lf





{1− (2 + µ) [(1− ρ)(1− γ) + ργ]} .
Using (54)–(56) and (59), (H1) can be rewritten as (61).
Appendix I: The Derivations of (66)
Substituting (26) for hiN in (17) yields


























Totally differentiating (I1) with respect to ρ and N , we obtain































(1 + tN ) pN
, i = m, f. (I3)
Substituting (I3) into the fourth term in (I2) and dividing the resulting equation by (1−ρ)c′′
yields (66).
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Appendix J: The Derivation of (78)
We substitute (75) for hc in (73) and consider the maximization of U . Allowing for (17),




= ρ(1− tm)wmlmN + (1− ρ)(1− tf )wf lfN − (1− ρ)c′ (J1)
− [(1− ρ)(1− γ) + ργ] (1 + tN )pN






























Using (11), (12), (17), (74), and (77), (J1) can be rewritten as
0 = ρ(1− tm)wmlmN + (1− ρ)(1− tf )wf lfN − (1− ρ)c′ (J2)
− [(1− ρ)(1− γ) + ργ] (1 + tN )pN − [(1− ρ)(1− ν) + ρν] (1 + tc)pchcN






{(1− tm)wmhmN + (1− tf )wfhfN
+ [(1− ρ)(1− ν) + ρν] (1 + tc)pchcN}.
Using (17), (J2) can be rewritten as (78).
Appendix K: The Proof of Proposition 6
By defining the Lagrange function as L and the Lagrange multiplier on the revenue con-
straint as λ, and by making use of (17), the first-order conditions of the government’s social
welfare maximization (85) subject to the revenue constraint (86) with respect to ty, tm, tf ,
















= −wmlm + (1− tm)wmlmtm + (1− tm)wmlmNNtm (K2)
− (lm + hm)ϕ (lmtm + hmtm) + (1− tf )wf lfNNtm − c′Ntm
− (1 + tN )pNNtm − (1 + tc)pchcNNtm














+ (2 + µ)N1−σ[sσmh
σ−1
m (hmtm + hmNNtm)
+ sσfh
σ−1





− λ(wmlm + tmwmlmtm + tmwmlmNNtm




= (1− tm)wmlmNNtf − wf lf + (1− tf )wf lftf + (1− tf )wf lfNNtf (K3)




− c′Ntf − (1 + tN )pNNtf − (1 + tc)pchcNNtf














+ (2 + µ)N1−σ[sσmh
σ−1













= (1− tm)wmlmNNtN + (1− tf )wf lfNNtN − c′NtN (K4)
− pNN − (1 + tN )pNNtN − (1 + tc)pchcNNtN
































= (1− tm)wmlmNNtc + (1− tf )wf lfNNtc − c′Ntc (K5)
− (1 + tN )pNNtc − pchc − (1 + tc)pchctc − (1 + tc)pchcNNtc























c (hctc + hcNNtc)]
− λ(tmwmlmNNtc + tfwf lfNNtc + tNpNNtc
+ pchc + tcpchctc + tcpchcNNtc).
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Using (11), (12), and (K4), after some manipulation, (K2) and (K3) can be rewritten as
tm : 0 = −(1 + λ)wmlm − λtmwmlmtm + (1 + µ)(1− tm)wmhmtm + (1 + λ)pNNN−1tN Ntm ,
tf : 0 = −(1 + λ)wf lf − λtfwf lftf + (1 + µ)(1− tf )wfhftf + (1 + λ)pNNN−1tN Ntf .
These two equations are the same as (52) and (53), respectively. Using the process of
Appendix G, we observe that the two equations lead to (89) and (90), respectively.
We next derive (92). Multiplying each term in (K4) by N−1tN Ntc and subtracting the
resulting equation from (K5), we obtain
0 = βpNNN
−1
tN Ntc + (1− β)pchc + (1− β)(1 + tc)pchctc
− (1− β)(2 + µ)N1−σsσc hσ−1c hctc − pchc − tcpchctc .
Using (74), this can be rewritten as
tc
1 + tc






− (1− β) 1
− (1+tc)hctchc
(K6)
+ (1− β)− (1− β)(2 + µ) [(1− ρ)(1− ν) + ρν] + 1
− (1+tc)hctchc
.
Using (54) and (87), after some manipulations, this can be rewritten as (92).
Finally, we derive the optimal child tax/subsidy expression. By multiplying each term in
(K4) by N−1tN and making use of (A2), (74), as well as the fact that hiNN = hi (i = m, f, c),
after some manipulations, (K4) can be rewritten as
0 = (1− tm)wmlmN + (1− tf )wf lfN − c′ − pNNN−1tN − (1 + tN )pN (K7)





{(1− tm)wmhmN + (1− tf )wfhfN
+ [(1− ρ)(1− ν) + ρν] (1 + tc)pchcN}
− λ
(
tmwmlmN + tfwf lfN + pNNN
−1
tN + tNpN + tcpchcN
)
.
Multiplying each term in (78) by (2 + µ) , subtracting the resulting equation from (K7), and
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making use of (17), we obtain
0 = [1− (2 + µ)(1− ρ)] c′ + (1 + λ)pNNN−1tN (K8)
+ {1− (2 + µ) [(1− ρ)(1− ν) + ρν]} (1 + tc)pchcN
+ λ (tmwmlmN + tfwf lfN + tNpN + tcpchcN )
+ {1− (2 + µ) [(1− ρ)(1− γ) + ργ]} (1 + tN )pN









[1− (2 + µ)(1− ρ)] c
′


































































Using the definition of β, (54), (55), (56), (59), and (87), (K9) can be rewritten as (91).
Appendix L: The Proof of Proposition 7























(1− ρ)(1− γ) + ργ
, (L2)





(1− ρ)(1− v) + ρv
. (L3)
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(1− 2ρ)(v − γ)
(1− ρ)(1− γ) + ργ
. (L4)
This shows that if ν = γ, then 1 − αNhc
ξ
δ = 0 and hence, the first term in (92) vanishes.
Thus, we obtain (95). Moreover, substituting (95) for rc in (91), the fourth term in (91)
offsets the second term in (93) and thus, we obtain (94).
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